Across the globe, more powers are being devolved to local and regional levels of government. This book provides an innovative analysis of such decentralisation in transition states in the Balkans. Using new and rich data, it shows how political elites use decentralisation strategically to ensure their access to state resources.

List of Figures and Tables Foreword List of Abbreviations 1. Centre-Periphery Relations in the Balkan 1.1. Problem definition and research question 1.2. Regional autonomy and decentralisation 1.3. The case studies: Serbia and Croatia in the context of former Yugoslavia 1.4. Research design, methodology and case selection 1.5. Outline of the book 2. A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources 2.1. Existing accounts of decentralisation 2.2. Resource dependency and elite agreements between centre and periphery 2.3. Conclusion 3. The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav Decentralisation 3.1. Pre-socialist legacies 3.2. Socialist legacies: Accommodation 3.3. Nationalist-authoritarian legacies from the 1990s: Confrontation 3.4. Conclusion 4. Access to Electoral Resources 4.1. Electoral resources in centre and periphery 4.2. The electoral systems in Serbia and Croatia 4.3. Access to electoral resources at regional and national level 4.4. Conclusion 5. Information Exchange and Cooperation 5.1. Centre-periphery relations during autonomy negotiations since 2000 5.2. Methodological note 5.3. Information exchange between centre and periphery 5.4. Strategic cooperation between centre and periphery 5.5. Conclusion 6. Access to Patronage Resources 6.1. Access to patronage resources as a causal mechanism 6.2. The extent of patronage in Serbia and Croatia 6.3. Methodological note 6.4. Expert survey results 6.5. The politicisation of state-owned enterprises and government funds 6.6. Conclusion 7. Conclusions APPENDIX ANNEX I: List of interviewees ANNEX II: List of organisations for network analysisANNEX III: Descriptive statistics of expert survey ANNEX IV: Timeline of decentralisation in Croatia (Istria) and Serbia (Vojvodina), 1990-2010 BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

'This exemplary study shows why decentralization reforms have different outcomes: Elites condition their support on whether such reforms offer greater access to electoral and patronage resources, and fewer constraints on distributing them. The book draws on groundbreaking field research revealing just how parties use decentralization to control jobs and fill their coffers. It is a hugely important contribution to the study of comparative politics, post-communist democratization and Southeastern Europe.' Milada A. Vachudova, Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, USA'This book sheds an important light on the dynamics of decentralisation in Eastern Europe and more generally brings in novel theoretical insights on the role of informal elite interactions in moulding the pace and scope of decentralization reforms.' Wilfried Swenden, Senior Lecturer of Politics, University of Edinburgh, UK'Decentralization reforms are popular in post-conflict societies. But what explains the willingness of national elites to invest in such reforms? Alexander Kleibrink develops a novel theoretical argument to this important question. His in-depth local knowledge allows him to assemble an impressive array of empirical evidence. This book is a must read for scholars interested in decentralization and regionalism, Balkan politics specialists, and also a note of caution for those uncritically advocating transfer of powers to subnational units.' Petr Kopecký, Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands

'This exemplary study shows why decentralization reforms have different outcomes: Elites condition their support on whether such reforms offer greater access to electoral and patronage resources, and fewer constraints on distributing them. The book draws on groundbreaking field research revealing just how parties use decentralization to control jobs and fill their coffers. It is a hugely important contribution to the study of comparative politics, post-communist democratization and Southeastern Europe.' Milada A. Vachudova, Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, USA 'This book sheds an important light on the dynamics of decentralisation in Eastern Europe and more generally brings in novel theoretical insights on the role of informal elite interactions in moulding the pace and scope of decentralization reforms.' Wilfried Swenden, Senior Lecturer of Politics, University of Edinburgh, UK 'Decentralization reforms are popular in post-conflict societies. But what explains the willingness of national elites to invest in such reforms? Alexander Kleibrink develops a novel theoretical argument to this important question. His in-depth local knowledge allows him to assemble an impressive array of empirical evidence. This book is a must read for scholars interested in decentralization and regionalism, Balkan politics specialists, and also a note of caution for those uncritically advocating transfer of powers to subnational units.' Petr Kopecky, Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands

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