<p>“The monograph is a useful and welcome work in several respects. It offers a fresh take on decentralisation studies, shifting away from ethnically-centred discussions on decentralisation … . the study is a refreshing and important one. The shift of focus towards the agency of the political elites, and in particular towards a resources-driven framework, is much needed; for anyone familiar with the region … .” (Tena Prelec, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 69 (6), 2017)</p><p>“There are several reasons to recommend Alexander Kleibrink’s Political Elites and Decentralization Reforms in the Post-Socialist Balkans to anyone interested in the politics of decentralization in Europe. … The analytical core of the book is a comparison of decentralization reforms in Croatia and Serbia, or more specifically of the devolution of powers to two historical regions within each country – Istria in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia.” (Vera Šćepanović, Regional Studies, July, 2016)</p>
Foreword
List of Abbreviations
1. Centre-Periphery Relations in the Balkan
1.1. Problem definition and research question
1.2. Regional autonomy and decentralisation
1.3. The case studies: Serbia and Croatia in the context of former Yugoslavia
1.4. Research design, methodology and case selection
1.5. Outline of the book
2. A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources
2.1. Existing accounts of decentralisation
2.2. Resource dependency and elite agreements between centre and periphery
2.3. Conclusion
3. The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav Decentralisation
3.1. Pre-socialist legacies
3.2. Socialist legacies: Accommodation
3.3. Nationalist-authoritarian legacies from the 1990s: Confrontation
3.4. Conclusion
4. Access to Electoral Resources
4.1. Electoral resources in centre and periphery
4.2. The electoral systems in Serbia and Croatia
4.3. Access to electoral resources at regional and national level
4.4. Conclusion
5. Information Exchange and Cooperation
5.1. Centre-periphery relations during autonomy negotiations since 2000
5.2. Methodological note
5.3. Information exchange between centre and periphery
5.4. Strategic cooperation between centre and periphery
5.5. Conclusion
6. Access to Patronage Resources
6.1. Access to patronage resources as a causal mechanism
6.2. The extent of patronage in Serbia and Croatia
6.3. Methodological note
6.4. Expert survey results
6.5. The politicisation of state-owned enterprises and government funds
6.6. Conclusion
7. Conclusions
APPENDIX
ANNEX I: List of interviewees
ANNEX II: List of organisations for network analysis
ANNEX III: Descriptive statistics of expert survey
ANNEX IV: Timeline of decentralisation in Croatia (Istria) and Serbia (Vojvodina), 1990-2010
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
'This book sheds an important light on the dynamics of decentralisation in Eastern Europe and more generally brings in novel theoretical insights on the role of informal elite interactions in moulding the pace and scope of decentralization reforms.' Wilfried Swenden, Senior Lecturer of Politics, University of Edinburgh, UK
'Decentralization reforms are popular in post-conflict societies. But what explains the willingness of national elites to invest in such reforms? Alexander Kleibrink develops a novel theoretical argument to this important question. His in-depth local knowledge allows him to assemble an impressive array of empirical evidence. This book is a must read for scholars interested in decentralization and regionalism, Balkan politics specialists, and also a note of caution for those uncritically advocating transfer of powers to subnational units.' Petr Kopecký, Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands