ContentsList of TablesList of AbbreviationsAcknowledgments1. Institutions, Poverty, and Democratic Consolidation2. Theorizing Representation and Accountability in a Context of Poverty3. Institutions and Poor People’s Confidence in Their Legislature4. Evolution of Institutions: An Overview of Honduras’s Political History5. Institutions and Incentives in Honduras’s Third-Wave Democracy6. Institutions, Incentives, and Roles: Legislators’ Identities About Their Job7. Roles, Attitudes, and Actions: Does Anyone Represent Poor People?8. Do the Poor Count in Latin American Democracies?Appendix: Coding Informal RolesReferencesIndex

“Despite the presence of large—even majority—poor populations in Latin America, democratic institutions and policies frequently do not reflect their interests. Taylor-Robinson’s book presents a thoughtful analysis of the causes of that ‘representation gap.’ She offers a rich institutional account, suggesting that a combination of institutions (electoral, nominations, and clientelistic) leads elected officials to respond differently to their privileged and poor constituencies. Both cross-national survey data and a detailed study of the Honduran case support her claim that the best representation the poor can hope for is usually clientelistic representation, and even that is not guaranteed. Yet Taylor-Robinson provides a final twist, insisting that clientelistic representation itself offers more benefits than are usually seen, for the poor themselves and for the stability of their political systems. Overall, this is an impressive book, which fruitfully applies the theoretical tools of rational-choice institutionalism to one of the most important problems of contemporary Latin American politics.”—Kathryn Hochstetler, Balsillie School of International Affairs and University of Waterloo