What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures.

1 COMPETING VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT ; The issues ; This book ; Background ; Economic Policy Making ; Political Economy ; Incentives and Selection in Politics ; Concluding Comments ; 2 THE ANATOMY OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE ; Introduction ; Three Notions of Government Failure ; The Basic Model ; Government Failure ; Democratic Political Failures ; A Dynamic Model ; Government Failure in the Dynamic Model ; Responses to Political Failure ; Concluding Comments ; 3 POLITICAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ; Introduction ; Elements of Political Agency Models ; The Baseline Model ; Extensions ; Discussion ; Concluding Comments ; 4 POLITICAL AGENCY AND PUBLIC FINANCE ; Introduction ; The Model ; Three Scenarios ; Implications ; Restraining Government ; Debt and Deficits ; Governments versus NGOs ; Competence ; Conclusions

`Besley's book has great strengths and is recommended to all modern students of political economy.' Peter J. Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne, The Review of Austrian Economics `Masterful...Principled Agents will be an essential resource for scholars' Scott Ashworth, Economica `'How can democratic competition make a government of politicians act as a government for the people? Tim Besley has given us a broad and deep analysis of this fundamental agency problem which is essential to the theory of democracy. This is an important book for anyone who wants to study political science with the best analytical tools of modern economics.'' Roger Myerson, William C. Norby Professor of Economics, University of Chicago `'How does the structure of democratic political institutions and organization shape policy choice? This path-breaking book boldly claims that well-designed institutions can help voters select politicians who are "better": more capable and more faithful to the fiduciary duties of public life. Novel in its emphasis on information, this unprecedentedly careful, thorough analysis of the "agency" problem links voters' ability to screen out bad politicians and discipline rent-seeking with the competence, motivation, and alignment of politicians' preferences to explain a wide variety of political economy and public finance outcomes including debt accumulation, the size and scope of government activities, corruption, and political turnover.'' James E. Alt, Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University `'A wonderful and important book, that combines state of the art analysis and deep knowledge of real world institutions to obtain novel insights about a fundamental issue. It should be read by all those who want to understand what it is that brings about good government.'' Guido Tabellini, Professor of Economics, Bocconi University `'Tim Besley demonstrates how to analyze political agency in the intellectual middle ground left open in between the optimism of the traditional welfare-economics approach, and the pessimism of the traditional public-choice approach. The key to good government is institution design- in the best Federalist tradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection to public office. Quite simply, a great book by a great economist.'' Torsten Persson, Director of the Institute for International Economic Studies

Applies simple economic models to political activities in an effort to explain the pre-conditions of good governance Provide students with an introduction to the most up-to-date thinking in the study of incentive problems in politics Multidisciplinary approach blends ideas from politics and economics

Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics at the LSE and Director of the Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the LSE. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). He has acted as Co-Editor of the American Economic Review and Managing Editor of the Economic Journal. He is an elected member of the Council of the Royal Economic Society, the Econometric Society, and the European Economics Association.

Applies simple economic models to political activities in an effort to explain the pre-conditions of good governance Provide students with an introduction to the most up-to-date thinking in the study of incentive problems in politics Multidisciplinary approach blends ideas from politics and economics