This book examines how trade policy is determined in democratic countries, and illustrates how protectionist policies are engendered by political processes that allow groups to pursue their own interests.

Introduction: The Efficiency of Free Trade and The Prevalence of Protection; Chapter 1 1. Identifying the Gainers and Losers from Protection; Chapter 2 2. Political Self-Interest Motives and Protection; Chapter 3 3. Protection under Direct Democracy; Chapter 4 4. Protection under Representative Democracy; Chapter 5 5. Shadow Prices of Factors and the Social Cost of Lobbying; Chapter 6 6. The Resource Cost of Political Contestability; Chapter 7 7. Political Choice of the Means of Protection; Chapter 8 8. Foreign Interests: The Role for Voluntary Export Restraints; Chapter 9 9. Trade Policy as Social Insurance; Chapter 10 10. The Institutional Setting; Chapter 11 11. Evidence; Chapter 12 12. Concluding Remarks;