This book applies institutional theory to the analysis of the post-Soviet Russian economy to bring to light the reasons why reforms have gone awry. Emphasis is put on the elements missed in the early blueprints of reforms: constraints embodied in formal and especially informal institutions.

Contents: Preface: Institutional traps in the post-privatization development of the Russian economy, Anton Oleinik. Recent Developments in Institutional Theory: The evolution of institutional theory and its structure, Rustem Nureev; Values, coordination and rationality: the economy of conventions, Laurent Th not, Francois Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, Andre Orl and Robert Salais; Transaction cost economics: from the Coase Theorem to empirical studies, Claude M rd; Theory of optimal contract: modeling contractual relationships, St ane Saussier; Theory of organizations: the diversity of arrangements in a developed market economy, Claude M rd; Institutionalism in a new economic history, Rustem Nureev and Yuri Latov. An Institutional Model of Russian Capitalism: The main institutional models of the emergence and development of capitalism, Rustem Nureev; A model of network capitalism: basic ideas and post-Soviet evidence, Anton Oleinik; A distrustful economy: an inquiry into foundations of the Russian market, Anton Oleinik; Post-Soviet privatization in the light of the Coase Theorem: transaction costs and governance costs, Wladimir Andreff; Russian privatization at bay: some unresolved transaction and governance cost issues in post-Soviet economies, Wladimir Andreff; Institutional analysis of the state, Anton Oleinik; The extralegal economy and the methods for analyzing it, Anton Oleinik; Business groups in Russian industries, Svetlana Avdasheva; Bibliography; Index.