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Rational Interaction Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi

Selten Reinhard
Innbundet / 1992 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9783540550679
Publisert
1992-02-10
Utgiver
Vendor
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Høyde
235 mm
Bredde
155 mm
Aldersnivå
Research, UP, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet

Redaktør
Selten Reinhard

Rational Interaction Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi

Selten Reinhard
Innbundet / 1992 / Engelsk
Selten Reinhard
Innbundet / 1992 / Engelsk
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This book is a collection of essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi. Originally, we hoped that it would be ready in the year of his 70th birthday, but we did not quite succeed. It sometimes takes longer than anticipated to do things as well as one wants. I think that John Harsanyi will understand this. It is my desire to express our thanks to all those who helped to make the book possible, especially to the publishing house, the Springer Verlag. I am grateful to Hildegard Grober who assisted us in the organizational tasks connected to our editorial effort. I am deeply indebted to Horace W. Brock. His active support was extremely valuable. The results of my editorial efforts should partly be attributed to him. Reinhard Selten Table of Contents Introduction 1 I. Coopera. tive Game Theory The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments by Michael Maschler and Guillermo Owen 5 Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory by Roger B. Myerson 13 The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games by Guillermo Owen 35 Voting by Count and Account by Bezalel Peleg 45 Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information by Joachim Rosenmftller 53 A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential 83 by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell II.
Les mer
The unifying theme in this series of essays is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John Harsanyi on game theory, social choice and the philosophy of science is interpreted and expanded by game theorists and economists representing a variety of theoretical investigations.
Les mer
I. Cooperative Game Theory.- The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments.- Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory.- The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games.- Voting Count and Account.- Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information.- A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential.- II. Mechanism Design.- Types Decomposition and Perfect Implementations.- Fair Division under Asymmetric Information.- Non-Transferable Utility and Bayesian Incentives.- III. Basic Questions of Non-Cooperative Game Theory.- Equilibrium Selection Unilateral Deviation Stability.- Determinacy and Rational Choice.- Inductive Reasoning in Repeated Games.- IV. Game Models.- Price-Quantity Oligopoly with Adjustment Costs.- A Demand Commitment Model of Coalition Bargaining.- The Reconciliation of Micro and Macro Economics.- V. Utilitarianism and Related Topics.- Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations.- Evolution and Convention: Social Contract IV.- Sex Differentiation in Annuities: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Inequality.- Utilitarianism, the Difference Principle, and the Veil of Ignorance: An Application of the Theory of Social Situations.- Bernoulli, Harsanyi, and the Principle of Temporal Good.- VI. Reflections.- Economics and Thermodynamics: von Neumann’s Problematic Conjecture.- Game Theory, Symmetry, and Scientific Discovery.- John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator.- List of Publications of John C. Harsanyi.
Les mer
GPSR Compliance The European Union's (EU) General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) is a set of rules that requires consumer products to be safe and our obligations to ensure this. If you have any concerns about our products you can contact us on ProductSafety@springernature.com. In case Publisher is established outside the EU, the EU authorized representative is: Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH Europaplatz 3 69115 Heidelberg, Germany ProductSafety@springernature.com
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This book is a collection of essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi. Originally, we hoped that it would be ready in the year of his 70th birthday, but we did not quite succeed. It sometimes takes longer than anticipated to do things as well as one wants. I think that John Harsanyi will understand this. It is my desire to express our thanks to all those who helped to make the book possible, especially to the publishing house, the Springer Verlag. I am grateful to Hildegard Grober who assisted us in the organizational tasks connected to our editorial effort. I am deeply indebted to Horace W. Brock. His active support was extremely valuable. The results of my editorial efforts should partly be attributed to him. Reinhard Selten Table of Contents Introduction 1 I. Coopera. tive Game Theory The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments by Michael Maschler and Guillermo Owen 5 Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory by Roger B. Myerson 13 The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games by Guillermo Owen 35 Voting by Count and Account by Bezalel Peleg 45 Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information by Joachim Rosenmftller 53 A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential 83 by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell II.
Les mer
The unifying theme in this series of essays is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John Harsanyi on game theory, social choice and the philosophy of science is interpreted and expanded by game theorists and economists representing a variety of theoretical investigations.
Les mer
I. Cooperative Game Theory.- The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments.- Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory.- The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games.- Voting Count and Account.- Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information.- A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential.- II. Mechanism Design.- Types Decomposition and Perfect Implementations.- Fair Division under Asymmetric Information.- Non-Transferable Utility and Bayesian Incentives.- III. Basic Questions of Non-Cooperative Game Theory.- Equilibrium Selection Unilateral Deviation Stability.- Determinacy and Rational Choice.- Inductive Reasoning in Repeated Games.- IV. Game Models.- Price-Quantity Oligopoly with Adjustment Costs.- A Demand Commitment Model of Coalition Bargaining.- The Reconciliation of Micro and Macro Economics.- V. Utilitarianism and Related Topics.- Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations.- Evolution and Convention: Social Contract IV.- Sex Differentiation in Annuities: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Inequality.- Utilitarianism, the Difference Principle, and the Veil of Ignorance: An Application of the Theory of Social Situations.- Bernoulli, Harsanyi, and the Principle of Temporal Good.- VI. Reflections.- Economics and Thermodynamics: von Neumann’s Problematic Conjecture.- Game Theory, Symmetry, and Scientific Discovery.- John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator.- List of Publications of John C. Harsanyi.
Les mer
GPSR Compliance The European Union's (EU) General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) is a set of rules that requires consumer products to be safe and our obligations to ensure this. If you have any concerns about our products you can contact us on ProductSafety@springernature.com. In case Publisher is established outside the EU, the EU authorized representative is: Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH Europaplatz 3 69115 Heidelberg, Germany ProductSafety@springernature.com
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9783540550679
Publisert
1992-02-10
Utgiver
Vendor
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Høyde
235 mm
Bredde
155 mm
Aldersnivå
Research, UP, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet

Redaktør
Selten Reinhard

Relaterte produkter