Authors Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo show how to use theoretical developments in evolutionary game theory to build useful models describing parts of the worlds we live in --- the natural world of biology, the social world of politics, economics, etc., and the virtual world that is emerging from our connected electronic devices.

PART I: BASICS 1. Population Dynamics 1.1 Fitness 1.2 Tradeoffs and Fitness Dependence 1.3 Dependence on environment, density and frequency 1.4 State space geometry 1.5 Memes and Genes 1.6 Finite populations and randomness 1.7 Replicator dynamics in discrete time 1.8 Replicator dynamics in continuous time 1.9 Steady states and stability 1.10 Sexual dynamics 1.11 Discussion 1.12 Appendix A: Derivation of the Fisher equation 1.13 Appendix B. Replicator dynamics, mean fitness, and entropy 1.14 Exercises 1.15 Endnotes 1.16 Bibliography 2. Simple Frequency Dependence 2.1 The Hawk-Dove game 2.2 H-D parameters and dynamics 2.3 The three kinds of 2x2 games . 2.4 Dilemmas played by viruses and eBay sellers 2.5 Nonlinear frequency dependence 2.6 RPS and the simplex 2.7 Replicator dynamics for RPS 2.8 Discussion 2.9 Appendix A. Payoff differences in 3x3 games 2.10 Exercises 2.11 Endnotes 2.12 Bibliography 3. Dynamics in n-dimensional Games 3.1 Sectoring the 2-d simplex 3.2 Estimating 3x3 payoff matrices 3.3 More strategies 3.4 Nonlinear frequency dependence 3.5 Two population games: the square 3.6 Hawk-Dove with two populations 3.7 Own population effects 3.8 Higher dimensional games 3.9 Alternative dynamics 3.10 Discussion 3.11 Appendix: Estimating 3x3 payoff matrices 3.12 Exercises 3.13 Notes 3.14 Bibliography 4. Equilibrium 4.1 Equilibrium in 1 dimension 4.2 Nash equilibrium with n strategies 4.3 ESS with n strategies 4.4 Equilibrium in multi-population games 4.5 Fisherian runaway equilibrium 4.6 Discussion 4.7 Appendix A: Techniques to Assess Stability 4.8 Exercises 4.9 Notes 4.10 Bibilography 5. Social games 5.1 Assortative matching 5.2 Social Twists 5.3 Inheritance from two parents 5.4 The standard Price equation 5.5 Group-structured Price equation and cooperation 5.6 Group Structure and Assortativity in Lizards 5.7 Price Equation in Continuous Time 5.8 Discussion 5.9 Appendix: Equilibrium in the Kirkpatrick (1982) model 5.10 Exercises 5.11 Notes 5.12 Bibliography 6. Cellular Automaton Games 6.1 Specifying a CA 6.2 Prisoner's Dilemma 6.3 Snowdrift 6.4 Public goods games with two strategies 6.5 Spatial rock-paper-scissors dynamic 6.6 Application to bacterial strains 6.7 Buyer-seller game as a two population CA 6.8 Exercises 6.9 Notes 6.10 Bibliography PART II: APPLICATIONS 7. Rock-Paper-Scissors Everywhere 7.1 Some RPS Theory 7.2 Humans Play RPS in the Lab 7.3 RPS Mating Systems 7.4 Predators Learn 7.5 A coevolutionary model of Predators and Prey 7.6 Discussion 7.7 Appendix 7.8 Exercises 7.9 Notes 7.10 Bibliography 8. Learning in Games 8.1 Perspectives on learning and evolution 8.2 An empirical example 8.3 Learning rules 8.4 Decision rules 8.5 Estimating a model 8.6 Results 8.7 Learning in Continuous Time . 8.8 Other Models of Learning 8.9 Open Frontiers 8.10 Appendix: Towards Models of Learning in Continuous Time 8.11 Exercises 8.12 Notes 8.13 Bibliography 9. Contingent Life Cycle Strategies 9.1 Hawks, Doves and Plasticity 9.2 Costly Plasticity 9.3 Classic Life Cycle Analysis 9.4 Strategic Life Cycle Analysis: Two Periods 9.5 Strategic Life Cycle Analysis: More general cases 9.6 Application: male elephant seals 9.7 Discussion 9.8 Appendix 9.9 Exercises 9.10 Notes 9.11 Bibliography 10. The Blessing and the Curse of the Multiplicative Updates (Contributed by Manfred K. Warmuth) 10.1 Demonstrating the blessing and the curse 10.2 Dispelling the curse 10.3 Discussion 10.4 Notes 10.5 Bibliography 11. Traffic Games (contributed by John Musacchio) 11.1 Simple Non-Atomic Traffic Games 11.2 Braess's Paradox 11.3 The Price of Anarchy with Nonlinear Latency Functions 11.4 Pigovian Taxes 11.5 Selfish Pricing 11.6 Circuit Analogy 11.7 Discussion 11.8 Exercises 11.9 Endnotes 11.10 Bibliography 12. International Trade and the Environment (contributed by Matthew McGinty) 12.1 Economics and evolutionary game theory 12.2 Static Cournot model 12.3 Green technology diffusion 12.4 International trade 12.5 International Trade and Pollution Taxation 12.6 Other Economic Applications 12.7 Exercises 12.8 Notes 12.9 Bibliography 13. Evolution of Cooperation 13.1 Coordination, cooperation and social dilemmas 13.2 Solution K: Kin Selection 13.3 Solution R: Bilateral reciprocity 13.4 Social preferences: a problematic solution 13.5 Early Human Niches 13.6 Solution M: Moral memes 13.7 Illustrative models 13.8 Prehistoric and historic moral codes 13.9 Discussion 13.10 Exercises 13.11 Notes 13.12 Bibliography 14. Speciation 14.1 Long run evolution 14.2 Adaptive Dynamics 14.3 Morph loss in RPS 14.4 Emergent Boundary Layers in Cellular Automata 14.5 Speciation in Social and Virtual Worlds 14.6 Discussion 14.7 Exercises 14.8 Endnotes 14.9 Bibliography Glossaries

Evolutionary Games is an excellent resource for self-study on applications of evolutionary game theory. The underlying mathematics is thoroughly and clearly presented, and the coding resources to help the reader further understand the material are helpful. Exercises and detailed appendices for most chapters round out this well-written and engaging text.

"Evolutionary Games is an excellent resource for self-study on applications of evolutionary game theory. The underlying mathematics is thoroughly and clearly presented, and the coding resources to help the reader further understand the material are helpful. Exercises and detailed appendices for most chapters round out this well-written and engaging text." -- Megan Sawyer, Southern New Hampshire University "There is a much to recommend in this book. It is a superior collection of theory and applications. The coverage of the theory of evolutionary games is broad-based. In addition, the chapters on applications span well-known and emerging areas of research. It is a valuable contribution for anyone interested in evolutionary game theory." -- Daniel G. Arce, Ashbel Smith Professor of Economics, University of Texas at Dallas "Evolutionary game theory offers a wealth of techniques for studying dynamics and stability in the social sciences, biology, and engineering. Through their clear and insightful exposition of a generous range of applications, Friedman and Sinervo have provided an invaluable road map for anyone looking to apply the theory on their own." -- Bill Sandholm, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin

Selling point: This is the first book to offer an exceptionally unified and accessible account of evolutionary games accessible to applied researchers. Selling point: The authors draw upon many real world examples from biology, computer science, economics, and other disciplines. Selling point: The book contains a new synthesis of known techniques for sectoring the state space, a new approach to socially mediated interactions featuring the Hadamard product of the fitness matrix with an adjustment matrix, new Dirichlet/maximum likelihood techniques for estimating payoff matrices, and a host of new syntheses of evolutionary game theory techniques with those of population genetics, classical game theory, and information theory.

Daniel Friedman is Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The author of over 100 articles and 5 previous books, his work has appeared in leading academic journals in economics, finance, and psychology. He is founder and director of LEEPS lab which conducts human subject experiments in market and strategic interaction, supported by 14 National Science Foundation grants along with grants from IBM, HP labs, Google, and Environmental Defense. Barry Sinervo, Full Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz, is an evolutionary biologist who conducts research on Behavioral Ecology, Game Theory and the Biotic Impacts of Climate Change. He has authored over 100 peer-reviewed publications. In addition to his research in game theory, he is currently researching contemporary extinctions of reptiles and amphibians and changes in plant communities driven by climate change, at sites distributed on five continents, leading a multinational research team of scientists developing physiological models of the biotic impacts of climate change on diverse biological systems, and measuring the biotic impacts of climate from equatorial sites to polar regions. He is also Director of the UC-wide Institute for the Study of the Ecological and Evolutionary Climate Impacts, a research consortium funded by a UC Presidential Research Catalyst Award.

Selling point: This is the first book to offer an exceptionally unified and accessible account of evolutionary games accessible to applied researchers. Selling point: The authors draw upon many real world examples from biology, computer science, economics, and other disciplines. Selling point: The book contains a new synthesis of known techniques for sectoring the state space, a new approach to socially mediated interactions featuring the Hadamard product of the fitness matrix with an adjustment matrix, new Dirichlet/maximum likelihood techniques for estimating payoff matrices, and a host of new syntheses of evolutionary game theory techniques with those of population genetics, classical game theory, and information theory.