Fiscal federalism has been the subject of much scholarly debate over the years. These volumes successfully bring together seminal articles from the past fifty years to demonstrate how the focus has evolved from 'first generation' to 'second generation' theories of intergovermental relations. The editors enhance the collection with detailed analyses of how competition affects relations between varying levels of government, and examine the hypotheses underlying the theory of fiscal federalism. This set of authoritative papers will be an indispensable reference source for scholars and practitioners in this field.
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These volumes successfully bring together seminal articles from the past fifty years to demonstrate how the focus has evolved from `first generationâ to `second generationâ theories of intergovermental relations.
Les mer
Contents:
Volume I â How Federal and Decentralized Systems Work and Institutional Underpinnings
Acknowledgements
Introduction Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio
PART I THEORETICAL ADVANCES
1. Roger B. Porter (1977) âJohn Stuart Mill and Federalismâ
2. Wallace E. Oates (2008) âOn the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutionsâ
3. Mancur Olson, Jr., (1969), âThe Principle of âFiscal Equivalenceâ: The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Governmentâ
4. Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren (1961), âThe Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiryâ
5. Wallace E. Oates (1981), âOn Local Finance and the Tiebout Modelâ
6. Albert Breton (1987), âTowards a Theory of Competitive Federalismâ
7. Paul Seabright (1996), âAccountability and Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Modelâ
8. Ben Lockwood (2009), âPolitical Economy Approaches to Fiscal Decentralizationâ
9. Pierre Salmon (1987), âDecentralization as an Incentive Schemeâ
PART II MOBILITY AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
10. Federico Revelli (2008), âPerformance Competition in Local Media Marketsâ
11. Jan K. Brueckner (2003), âStrategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of Empirical Studiesâ
12. Michael Keen (1998), âVertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalismâ
13. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen (1993), âJeux Sans Frontières: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Sizeâ
14. David E. Wildasin (2003), âLiberalization and the Spatial Allocation of Population in Developing and Transition Countriesâ
15. Avinash Dixit and John Londregan (1998), âFiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politicsâ
PART III INSTITUTIONS
16. Pierre Salmon (2002), âDecentralization and Supranationality: The Case of the European Unionâ
17. Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1996), âFOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europeâ
18. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2007), âA Contractual Approach to Multi-level Governanceâ
19. Roger D. Congleton, Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria (2009), âA Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreementâ
20. J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford and Harvey Lazar (2002), âThe Institutions of Executive Federalism: Myths and Realitiesâ
21. Stephen Soul and Brian Dollery (2000), âAn Analysis of the Criteria Used by Australian Local Government Amalgamation Inquiries Between 1960 and 1992â
22. Tugrul Gurgur and Anwar Shah (2002), âLocalization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandoraâs Box?â
23. C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin and Daniel Treisman (2009), âPolitical Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from Around the Worldâ
Volume II â Federal and Decentralized Policy, Governance, Issues and Challenges
An Introduction to both volumes by the editors appears in Volume I
PART I DECENTRALIZED POLICIES AND GOVERNANCE
1. Ehtisham Ahmad, Giorgio Brosio and Vito Tanzi (2008), âLocal Service Provision in Selected OECD Countries: Do Decentralized Operations Work Better?â
2. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee (2005), âDecentralizing Anti-poverty Program Delivery in Developing Countriesâ
3. Jean-Philippe Platteau (2009), âInformation Distortion, Elite Capture and Task Complexity in Decentralized Developmentâ
4. Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast (1995), âFederalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in Chinaâ
5. Ehtisham Ahmad, Keping Li and Thomas Richardson (2002), âRecentralization in China?â
PART II FINANCING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
6. Maria Flavia Ambrosanio and Massimo Bordignon (2006), âNormative Versus Positive Theories of Revenue Assignments in Federationsâ
7. Wallace E. Oates (1999), âLocal Property Taxation: An Assessmentâ
8. Robin Boadway (2009), âThe Design of a VAT for Multi-Government Jurisdictions: Lessons from Canadaâ
9. Richard A. Musgrave (1961), âApproaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political Federalismâ
10. Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager (2008), âAccountability and Fiscal Equalizationâ
11. Stephen J. Bailey and Stephen Connolly (1998), âThe Flypaper Effect: Identifying Areas for Further Researchâ
12. Ehtisham Ahmad, JosĂŠ GonzĂĄlez Anaya, Giorgio Brosio, Mercedes Garcia-Escribano, Ben Lockwood and Ernesto Revilla (2007), âWhy Focus On Spending Needs Factors? The Political Economy of Fiscal Transfer Reforms in Mexicoâ
13. Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber (2005), âTransfers in a Polarized Country: Bridging the Gap Between Efficiency and Stabilityâ
PART III TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
14. Charles E. McLure, Jr. (1983), âFiscal Federalism and the Taxation of Economic Rentsâ
15. Giorgio Brosio (2003), âOil Revenue and Fiscal Federalismâ
PART IV GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
16. Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria Albino-War and Raju Singh (2006), âSubnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerationsâ
17. Thomas J. Nechyba (2008), âPublic and Private School Competition and U.S. Fiscal Federalismâ
18. Ivan Barankay and Ben Lockwood (2007), âDecentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence From Swiss Cantonsâ
19. Jon Magnussen, Terje P. Hagen and Oddvar M. Kaarboe (2007), âCentralized or Decentralized? A Case Study of Norwegian Hospital Reformâ
20. Keith G. Banting and Stan Corbett (2002), âHealth Policy and Federalism: An Introductionâ
PART V MACRO-FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUB NATIONAL DEBT
21. Yingyi Qian and GĂŠrard Roland (1998), âFederalism and the Soft Budget Constraintâ
22. Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels (2002), âBeyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systemsâ
23. Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel (2008), âInterregional Redistribution and Budget Institutions Under Asymmetric Informationâ
PART VI ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL DISASTERS
24. Wallace E. Oates (2002), âA Reconsideration of Environmental Federalsimâ
25. Richard L. Revesz (1997), âFederalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critiqueâ
26. Alistair Ulph (1998), âPolitical Institutions and the Design of Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Informationâ
27. Timothy J. Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout (2007), âOn the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federationâ
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9781848444430
Publisert
2011-03-31
Utgiver
Vendor
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Høyde
244 mm
Bredde
169 mm
AldersnivĂĽ
P, 06
SprĂĽk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
1328