<i>'[T]his volume offers valuable insights into theories of public choice and their application to public law. . . one of the benefits that the Handbook offers environmental lawyers is the opportunity to engage in an interdisciplinary scholarly exchange: to challenge and confirm claims about environmental law and environmental regulatory processes as set out in public choice theory.'</i><br /> --Sanja Bogojevic, <i>Climate Law</i>

Public choice theory sheds light on many aspects of legislation, regulation, and constitutional law and is critical to a sophisticated understanding of public policy. The editors of this landmark addition to the law and economics literature have organized the Handbook into four main areas of inquiry: foundations, constitutional law and democracy, administrative design and action, and specific statutory schemes. The original contributions, authored by top scholars in the field, provide helpful introductions to important topics in public choice and public law while also exploring the institutional complexity of American democracy. Beginning with a critical introduction to the core tenets of public choice theory and concluding with comprehensive analyses of drug safety, energy regulation, and environmental law, the Handbook provides differing points of view on the foundations of these and a range of related subjects, including: direct democracy and its financial implications, the functioning of electoral processes, judicial behavior, and the structural differences between presidential and parliamentary systems. The Handbook's knowledgeable contributors offer a rich, realistic view of how public policy is made that is accessible to a broad range of readers. Summarizing much of the key literature in a range of major topics and framing that literature for open debates and further research, the Handbook is ideal for students and scholars of law, political science, and economics. Contributors: D. Carpenter, S. Croley, D.A. Farber, E. Garrett, J.E. Gersen, T. Ginsburg, R.M. Hills, Jr, S. Issacharoff, T. Jacobi, J. Mashaw, L. Miller, A.J. O'Connell, B.D. Richman, J. Rossi, C.H. Schroeder, M.L. Stearns, M.C. Stephenson, J.B. Wiener
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Public choice theory sheds light on many aspects of legislation, regulation, and constitutional law and is critical to a sophisticated understanding of public policy.
Contents: Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public Choice and Public Law Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell PART I: FOUNDATIONS 1. Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement Jerry Mashaw 2. Interest Groups and Public Choice Steven Croley 3. An Introduction to Social Choice Maxwell L. Stearns PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4. Direct Democracy Elizabeth Garrett 5. Democracy and Electoral Processes Samuel Issacharoff and Laura Miller 6. Federalism and Public Choice Roderick M. Hills, Jr 7. The Judiciary Tonja Jacobi 8. Public Choice and Constitutional Design Tom Ginsburg PART III: AGENCY DESIGN AND ACTION 9. Statutory Interpretation by Agencies Matthew C. Stephenson 10. Designing Agencies Jacob E. Gersen 11. Mechanism Choice Jonathan B. Wiener and Barak D. Richman PART IV: SPECIFIC STATUTORY SCHEMES 12. Reputation, Information and Confidence: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Regulation Daniel Carpenter 13. Public Choice, Energy Regulation and Deregulation Jim Rossi 14. Public Choice and Environmental Policy Christopher H. Schroeder Index
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'[T]his volume offers valuable insights into theories of public choice and their application to public law. . . one of the benefits that the Handbook offers environmental lawyers is the opportunity to engage in an interdisciplinary scholarly exchange: to challenge and confirm claims about environmental law and environmental regulatory processes as set out in public choice theory.' --Sanja Bogojevic, Climate Law
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Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9781847206749
Publisert
2010-07-30
Utgiver
Vendor
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Høyde
244 mm
Bredde
169 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
512

Om bidragsyterne

Edited by Daniel A. Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Stanford University, Law School, US