Economists and political scientists have recently begun to study formally how conftict and the possibility of conftict affects resource allocation and economic performance.! For example, an extensive empiricalliterature suggests that conftict and political instability adversely affects economic development and that higher 2 inequality causes poor economic performance by inducing increased conftict. In this paper I argue that a serious ftaw in this research has taken too individu 3 alistic a view of conftict. While the approach of methodological individualism is attractive, in reality individuals act not purely in isolation, but also as part of larger social groupings and networks. I therefore try to consider how these models of conftict may be extended to this type of situation and thus attempt to place individuals within a larger social setting to see how this alters our intuitions about conftict and its economic and political determinants and implications. But what groups are relevant? Individuals belong to many overlapping and cross cutting groups in society. While traditional Marxist analysis stressed dass groupings so that workers associated with workers and capitalists with capitalists, more recent literature (see Wright, 1985) has stressed the diversity of social groupings. Rather than associate along dass lines one might associate along gender, religious, or perhaps ethnic lines. Many strands of research have show how thinking of groups in this heterogeneous way can iIluminate both economic 4 and political behavior.
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Economists and political scientists have recently begun to study formally how conftict and the possibility of conftict affects resource allocation and economic performance.!
The wide importance of conflict.- Social identity, inequality and conflict.- Butter and guns: Complementarity between economic and military competition.- Targeting and political support for welfare spending.- How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist’s view.- Tax resistance, economy and state transformation in China and Europe.- The rationality of revolution.- Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players.- Property rights and the evolution of the state.- The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not.- Social decision rules are not immune to conflict.
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Springer Book Archives
Springer Book Archives
State-of-the-art applications of economic theory to issues of conflict Studies of crime, dictatorship, and revolutions with interesting historical material Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9783642055270
Publisert
2010-11-30
Utgiver
Vendor
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Høyde
235 mm
Bredde
155 mm
Aldersnivå
Research, P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet