Learning to Forget US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq
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David Fitzgerald is Lecturer in International Politics in the School of History at University College Cork, Ireland."This book is highly recommended reading for the national security policy community, military officers, and those who are interested in understanding the evolution of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine in the last half century."—Peter R. Mansoor, <i>Political Science Quarterly</i>
"<i>Learning to Forget</i> is a masterful study of counterinsurgency thought and practice in the United States from Vietnam to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . [T]he book is a scholarly and thought-provoking work that deserves to be read by anyone wishing to study counterinsurgency doctrine's past and its future prospects as a tool in the military and foreign policy arsenal of the United States."—Andrew J. Birtle, <i>Army History Magazine</i>
"This is another welcome addition to the spate of recent literature on counterinsurgency . . . The book's strong suit is Fitzgerald's use of many primary documents, particularly the many studies written during the war analyzing US efforts in Indochina . . . [T]his is a fine contribution to the literature on both counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War . . . Recommended."—J. Fields, <i>CHOICE</i>
"An excellent study that takes a hard look at America's longest and possibly darkest military shadow."—Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, US Army War College
"Among the many notable works on the legacy of Vietnam, the decline and resurgence of counterinsurgency doctrine, and the conduct of the Iraq-Afghanistan wars, Fitzgerald's is exemplary. It is a masterful work of research, of synthesis and original analysis, and of clear and insightful writing." —Brian McAllister Linn, Texas A&M University; author of <i>The Philippine War, 1899–1902</i>