Anatomy of Victory Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq
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John D. Caldwell retired in 2007 after a fifty-year career in defense think tanks and aerospace companies. Trained as a political scientist with a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, he was first posted to Saigon in 1968 as part of a classified research project for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency. Caldwell joined TRW Space & Defense in 1982 to work on major defense, NASA, and intelligence community programs. He remains an active consultant at Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, which acquired TRW in 2002. He lives in Santa Barbara with his wife, Karen, and their dog Daisy, cat Mr. Bingley, and Martha, a desert tortoise.Caldwell, a defense analyst, offers up a strategic survey of America’s major wars since 1941 to determine why the U.S. was victorious in WWII but has not meet its objectives in the major wars since. . . . [For] those who are interested in but have not read deeply on military strategy, this will be illuminating.
Publishers Weekly
Excellent! Fills an important void in our understanding about policy, strategy, and operations.
- H. R. McMaster,
Readers can learn from and enjoy every page of this book, which displays the rare ability to seize immediately upon the essence of military questions. Unfortunately, not many of our generals—and far fewer of our elected leaders—have Caldwell’s talent for prescribing the necessities of victory and proscribing the causes of defeat. In masterful summaries that are equal parts history and analysis, he takes us on a truly professional tour of our wars since 1941, allowing us to share his great gift for strategic clarity.
- Mark Helprin,
As interesting a book as it gets. . . . The central problem the author addresses is the unsatisfying outcome to the conflicts after 1945. This is something few of us who witnessed the World War think about. Why has the good Uncle become such a patsy? . . . Caldwell offers a set of guidelines about how to think about involvement in any continuing or future conflict. They make a lot of sense. First and foremost is to align an overseas mission goal with America’s core interests and how to achieve that goal. If alignment fails, however, the mission risks failure beyond America’s control.
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