Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) inspired two major philosophical revolutions. The ideas presented in his Tractus Logico-Philosophicus are standardly contrasted with those in his later Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations. Yet scant attention has been paid to why Wittgenstein later rejected his early ideas and proposed a radically different view.Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition offers a detailed exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a continuous engagement with a single set of problems. Dale Jacquette argues that the key to understanding the transition in Wittgenstein's thought is his 1929 essay "Some Remarks on Logical Form," which is reprinted in this book. Wittgenstein disowned the essay, then came to see its failure as refuting his early theory altogether and began to investigate the requirements of meaning with a new method that resulted in the characteristic innovations of his later period. A comprehensive account of Wittgenstein's early philosophy sets the stage for the first systematic commentary on the 1929 essay to appear in the extensive literature on Wittgenstein. The main themes of Wittgenstein's later work are then presented against the background of his rejection of the early theory. The book concludes with a critical assessment of Wittgenstein's legacy as among the most important contributions to contemporary philosophy.