We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how 'expert testimony' and 'the wisdom of crowds' are tested and provides convincing ideas that make it rational to believe something simply because other people believe it. Matheson then takes on philosophy’s best arguments against his thesis, including the idea that non-self-thinkers are free-riding on the work of others, Socrates’ claim that 'the unexamined life isn’t worth living,' and that outsourcing your intellectual labor makes you vulnerable to errors and manipulation. Matheson shows how these claims and others ultimately fail -- and that when it comes to thinking, we often need not be sheepish about being sheep.Key FeaturesDiscusses the idea of not thinking for yourself in the context of contemporary issues like climate change and vaccinationsEngages in numerous contemporary debates in social epistemologyExamines what can be valuable about thinking for yourself and argues that these are insufficient to require you to do soOutlines the key, practical takeaways from the argument in an epilogue
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We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does her own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.
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Chapter 1 IntroductionKeeping your House in OrderWhat is Thinking for Yourself?Clarifying the Central ConclusionLooking AheadChapter 2 Believing (Just) Because Others Believe: Epistemic Surrogates From Individual to Social EpistemologyBelieving the Experts & Epistemic SurrogacyThe Wisdom of CrowdsThe UpshotChapter 3 The Argument from ExpertiseMotivating the Argument Applying the ArgumentAn Initial Worry: Identifying the ExpertsThe UpshotChapter 4 The Argument from Evidential SwampingMotivating the ArgumentApplying the ArgumentThe UpshotChapter 5 The Autonomy ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionThe Myth of Intellectual IndividualismAutonomy as Intellectual FreedomAutonomy as Intellectual VirtueWrap-UpChapter 6 The Free-Rider ObjectionMotivating the Objection The Cognitive Division of Labor Epistemic Trespassing The Wisdom of Crowds Again Wrap-UpChapter 7 The Socratic ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionNormative QuestionsNo Relevant ExpertsThe Importance of Getting it RightMoral VirtueIn Favor of Socratic DeferenceWrap-UpChapter 8 The Vulnerability Objection Motivating the Objection The Inevitability of VulnerabilityVulnerability and Checks & BalancesThe Importance of InstitutionsWrap-UpChapter 9 The Understanding ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionUnderstanding Without Thinking for YourselfSetting the ScopeEpistemic SatisficingWrap-UpChapter 10 The Intellectual Virtue ObjectionMotivating the ObjectionCultivating Intellectual Character Through DeferenceCartesian Epistemology & Social EpistemologySocial Intellectual VirtuesWrap-Up
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Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9781032438269
Publisert
2023-09-29
Utgiver
Vendor
Routledge
Vekt
280 gr
Høyde
198 mm
Bredde
129 mm
Aldersnivå
G, U, 01, 05
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
244

Forfatter

Om bidragsyterne

Jonathan Matheson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida. His research interests are in epistemology, with a focus on issues concerning disagreement and epistemic autonomy. He has authored The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2015) and co-edited The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social (2014) with Rico Vitz and Epistemic Autonomy (2021) with Kirk Lougheed.