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Francesco Orsi is Senior Research Fellow in Practical Philosophy at the University of Tartu, Estonia.[Orsi] manages to be both clear and accessible as he navigates the many distinctions and relations that have come to populate the field. ... [A] welcome addition to the literature and a useful resource.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Orsi provides a detailed but succinct exploration of every axis of value theory, with special attention to the fitting attitude theory. Clearly written and tightly argued, this book is a thorough guide to the shape of value that also advances current debates in creative and engaging ways.
Scott A. Davison, Professor of Philosophy and Chair, Department of History, Philosophy, Religion and Legal Studies, Morehead State University, USA
Francesco Orsi’s Value Theory is the first thorough overview of all the main distinctions and debates in the rich philosophical tradition of investigating the evaluative realm. It is also historically informed, clear, balanced, and well-argued overall.
Dr Jussi Suikkanen, Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, UK
Orsi's book lucidly explores core conceptual questions at the very fore of value theory. The focus is on the much-discussed fitting-attitude analysis of value, and Orsi serves as an excellent and attentive guide, as the reader explores the advantages as well as the more serious rocks and shoals inherent in this approach. Not only is the book a great introduction to this pattern of analysis, it provides a distinguished contribution to contemporary value theory.
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden
What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dimensions, structures and connections that value concepts express are interrogated with clarity and incision.
Orsi provides a systematic survey of both classic texts including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Moore and Ross and an array of contemporary theorists. The reader is guided through the moral maze of value theory with everyday examples and thought experiments. Rare stamps, Napoleon's hat, evil demons, and Kant's good will are all considered in order to probe our intuitions, question our own and philosophers' assumptions about value, and, ultimately, understand better what we want to say when we talk about value.
1. Value and Normativity
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Which Evaluations?
1.3 The Idea of Value Theory
1.4 Value and Normativity
1.5 Overview
1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality
1.7 Value Theory: The Questions
2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co.
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples
2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value
2.4 The Reduction to Facts
2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value
2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value?
2.7 Summary
3. The Challenge against Absolute Value
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness
3.3 Foot and the Virtues
3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way
3.5 Zimmerman’s Ethical Goodness
3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes
3.7 Summary
4. Personal Value
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Moore on Good and Good For
4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes
4.4 Moore Strikes Back?
4.5 Agent-relative Value
4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative
4.7 Summary
5. The Chemistry of Value
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations
5.3 Organic Unities
5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value
5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value
5.6 Holism and Particularism
5.7 Summary
6. Value Relations
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability
6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability
6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations
6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity
6.6 Parity and Choice
6.7 Parity and Incomparability
6.8 Summary
7. How Do I Favour Thee?
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring
7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing
7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value?
7.5 Summary
8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
8.1 Introduction
8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals
8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response
8.5 Reasons for What?
8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons
8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority
8.8 Summary
Bloomsbury Ethics is a series of books on established and new areas in moral philosophy. Each book is designed both to introduce upper-level undergraduates and postgraduates to a key field in ethics, and to develop a particular viewpoint within that field designed to appeal to researchers. All areas of moral philosophy are covered, from the theoretical to the practical. New proposals are always welcome. Please contact the series editors.
Series Editors:
Thom Brooks, Law, University of Durham, thom.brooks@durham.ac.uk
Simon Kirchin, Philosophy, University of Kent, s.t.kirchin@kent.ac.uk