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Value Gap

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni
Innbundet / 2021 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780192848215
Publisert
2021
Utgiver
Oxford University Press; Oxford University Press
Vekt
518 gr
Høyde
240 mm
Bredde
163 mm
Dybde
18 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
238

Forfatter
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

Om bidragsyterne

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen is a Professor and Acting Chair in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. In 2015, he was elected member of Academia Europea. He is the author of Personal Value (OUP, 2011), and has more recently published articles on moral progress, fitting-attitude analysis, intrinsic and extrinsic value, pro- and contra-attitudes, reasons, and on the metaethical view that he calls on-conditionalism.

Value Gap

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni
Innbundet / 2021 / Engelsk
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni
Innbundet / 2021 / Engelsk
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This volume provides an engaging discussion of the distinction between relational and nonrelational goods, that is, being good for a subject rather than being good simpliciter.

W. Simkulet, CHOICE

Ronnow-Rasmussen's Value Gap is a sustained argument for Dualism, the idea that there are two coherent value notions-final goodness, final goodness for-that cannot be understood in terms of each other. Along the way, Ronnow-Rasmussen touches on many of the central issues of contemporary value theory. The book is full of ideas, arguments, and distinctions, and rewards careful study. It is lively and interesting, and recommended to those working in these fields.

Timothy Perrine, Journal of Moral Philosophy

The book has many virtues. It is full of interesting puzzles and arguments about the distinction between good and good-for, as well as about the fitting attitude account of value, and will be of interest to anyone working on either topic. The book effectively continues his previous book, Personal Value (2011), and like that book, has an exploratory style which is endearingly humble, and which enables Rønnow-Rasmussen to explore the issues in a fair-minded way.

Alex Gregory, UtilitasUtilitas

In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis--reasons and pro-attitudes--Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable.
Les mer
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen explores the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for: he argues that these two value notions are equally important in ethics and practical deliberation. His analysis challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas.
Les mer
Part I: Elements 1: Value Taxonomy 2: Good and Good-For 3: Challenging Value Monism 4: Challenging Good Monism 5: Good-For Unitarianism Part II: A Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value 6: Fitting-Attitude Analysis 7: The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes 8: The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised 9: 'Sake' 10: FA and Motivating Reasons 11: Favourings for No Reason 12: Mind the Value Gap
Les mer
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen is a Professor and Acting Chair in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. In 2015, he was elected member of Academia Europea. He is the author of Personal Value (OUP, 2011), and has more recently published articles on moral progress, fitting-attitude analysis, intrinsic and extrinsic value, pro- and contra-attitudes, reasons, and on the metaethical view that he calls on-conditionalism.
Les mer
Presents novel arguments against well-established positions in value theory Argues for an improved form of the fitting-attitude analysis of value Provides new insights about reasons, attitudes, and values An accessible introduction to this area of debate
Les mer

Relaterte produkter

This volume provides an engaging discussion of the distinction between relational and nonrelational goods, that is, being good for a subject rather than being good simpliciter.

W. Simkulet, CHOICE

Ronnow-Rasmussen's Value Gap is a sustained argument for Dualism, the idea that there are two coherent value notions-final goodness, final goodness for-that cannot be understood in terms of each other. Along the way, Ronnow-Rasmussen touches on many of the central issues of contemporary value theory. The book is full of ideas, arguments, and distinctions, and rewards careful study. It is lively and interesting, and recommended to those working in these fields.

Timothy Perrine, Journal of Moral Philosophy

The book has many virtues. It is full of interesting puzzles and arguments about the distinction between good and good-for, as well as about the fitting attitude account of value, and will be of interest to anyone working on either topic. The book effectively continues his previous book, Personal Value (2011), and like that book, has an exploratory style which is endearingly humble, and which enables Rønnow-Rasmussen to explore the issues in a fair-minded way.

Alex Gregory, UtilitasUtilitas

In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis--reasons and pro-attitudes--Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable.
Les mer
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen explores the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for: he argues that these two value notions are equally important in ethics and practical deliberation. His analysis challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas.
Les mer
Part I: Elements 1: Value Taxonomy 2: Good and Good-For 3: Challenging Value Monism 4: Challenging Good Monism 5: Good-For Unitarianism Part II: A Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value 6: Fitting-Attitude Analysis 7: The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes 8: The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised 9: 'Sake' 10: FA and Motivating Reasons 11: Favourings for No Reason 12: Mind the Value Gap
Les mer
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen is a Professor and Acting Chair in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. In 2015, he was elected member of Academia Europea. He is the author of Personal Value (OUP, 2011), and has more recently published articles on moral progress, fitting-attitude analysis, intrinsic and extrinsic value, pro- and contra-attitudes, reasons, and on the metaethical view that he calls on-conditionalism.
Les mer
Presents novel arguments against well-established positions in value theory Argues for an improved form of the fitting-attitude analysis of value Provides new insights about reasons, attitudes, and values An accessible introduction to this area of debate
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780192848215
Publisert
2021
Utgiver
Oxford University Press; Oxford University Press
Vekt
518 gr
Høyde
240 mm
Bredde
163 mm
Dybde
18 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
238

Forfatter
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni

Om bidragsyterne

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen is a Professor and Acting Chair in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. In 2015, he was elected member of Academia Europea. He is the author of Personal Value (OUP, 2011), and has more recently published articles on moral progress, fitting-attitude analysis, intrinsic and extrinsic value, pro- and contra-attitudes, reasons, and on the metaethical view that he calls on-conditionalism.

Relaterte produkter