1. The Spread Mind 1.1 What, where and when is experience? 1.2 Experience is the object 1.3 I am world 1.4 A better object? 1.5 Nothing appears, everything takes place 1.6 Appearance is reality 1.7 Shangri-La 2. The Spread Object 2.1 The fridge-light model of the object 2.2 Traditional and actual spread objects 2.3 Senses as multiple objects 2.4 Phenomenal is physical 2.5 The last Ptolemaic stand 2.6 Percipere est esse 3. The causal geometry of experience 3.1 Stretching over space and time 3.2 Glass, mirrors and beyond 3.3 A storage-less model of memory 3.4 Dreams and hallucinations as spatiotemporal kaleidoscopes 3.5 The causal argument revisited 3.6 Return to Shangri-La 4. Illusions 4.1 Proxy and alleged properties 4.2 Illusions as misbeliefs 4.3 A zoo of illusions 4.4 Benham's Top 4.5 A comparison with other accounts 5. Hallucinations and dreams 5.1 Ordinary and extraordinary hallucinations 5.2 Gerrymandered objects and direct brain stimulation 5.3 Double preemption 5.4 A continuum – from objects to hallucinations 5.5 The common kind assumption 6. A zoo of objects and experiences 6.1 The myth of endogenous mental experience 6.2 Phosphenes and blindness 6.3 Visual images and congenitally blinds 6.4 Geometric hallucinations 6.5 Impossible, forbidden and Martian colors 6.6 Additions and subtractions 6.7 Afterimages 6.8 The myth of supersaturated red 6.9 Filling in 6.10 Innate phantom limbs 7. Joint causation and wholes 7.1 Actual existence 7.2 Objects and wholes 7.3 Joint causation 7.4 No time, no wholes 7.5 The cause of the cause is the effect 8. The spread now 8.1 The present is not punctual 8.2 The spread now 8.3 Now is relative and multiple 8.4 Present is near past and past is far present 8.5 Pastness has no color 8.6 The time-gap argument 8.7 Time is an ocean, the present is its shore 9. In nature, identity is the only relation 9.1 A is A 9.2 Thou shalt have no other relations before me 9.3 Kinds of representations 9.4 Brains as world makers 10. Look at the universe and you'll see yourself References

Manzotti will be coming to the U.S. this winter, in part to promote his book. We will work very hard to set up interviews with, and features on, him; given his track record on the NYRB and elsewhere we're optimistic. He has an accent, but is charming and approachable.

"I look around. I see a world made of objects and their properties. By and large, if something is physical, it should be locatable in space and time. Everything, since it is a part of nature, must be somewhere and at some time. No exact punctual location is required. A location can be fuzzy, vague, probabilistic, and plagued by uncertainty. Then, in the world I live in and perceive, what and where is my experience? Slightly more unusually, when does my experience take place? Roughly, we know where our bodies are. Likewise, we know where either the moon or a red apple is. Here, however, I do not refer to my body, but to the thing that my experience is – customarily described in terms of perceptions, dreams, thoughts, and desires7F. Can I locate my own experience as I can locate the performance of Vivaldi's Gloria I heard at the Boston Symphony Hall on the afternoon of March 12, in 2014? Can I locate my dream of a pink elephant in the same way? Where, when and what is the stuff my dreams are made of? To this day, both scientists and philosophers falter when confronted with such questions – whether it be a dream, a hallucination, or a perception. At best, scholars of a scientific bent point at correlates, supervenience bases, representational vehicles, and so forth. The hesitation is embarrassing because if one assumes that experience is a natural phenomenon, it ought to be spatiotemporally located. However, putting the mind inside the brain has not yielded any solid finding because, trivially, nothing inside a brain has the properties of our experience. So, again, what, where and when is experience?"