Sellars (1912-1989) was, in the opinion of many, the most important American philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. This collection, coedited by Sellars’s chief interpreter and intellectual heir, should do much to elucidate and clearly establish the significance of this difficult thinker's vision for contemporary philosophy.

Editors' Introduction Editorial Notes Part I: Language and Meaning 1. Inference and Meaning 2. Some Reflections on Language Games 3. Language as Thought and as Communication 4. Meaning as Functional Classification: A Perspective on the Relation of Syntax to Semantics Part II: Abstract Entities 5. Naming and Saying 6. Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology 7. Abstract Entities Part III: Mind, Language, and the World 8. Being and Being Known 9. The Lever of Archimedes 10. Some Reflections on Thoughts and Things 11. Mental Events Part IV: Science and the Mind 12. Phenomenalism 13. The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem 14. Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man Part V: Kant 15. "This I or He or It (the Thing) Which Thinks" 16. Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience 17. The Role of Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience Credits Index

Sellars was as original a mind as C.S. Peirce, and it has taken almost as long for the importance of his ideas to be appreciated. Once this collection appears in print, we shall see articles about Sellars popping up all over the journals, just as articles about Peirce began popping up after Hartshorne and Weiss had finished their editorial work. The editors of the collection have made very judicious choices about what to republish. They have arranged the essays in an illuminating sequence so as to make clear that the heart of Sellars's thought is what Brandom calls his "inferentialist" conception of meaning. Inferentialism was shadowed forth darkly in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, but Sellars was the first to make it explicit and to grasp its full implications. It represents a radical break with the representationalist way of thinking of mental and linguistic items that has been dominant in Western philosophy since Descartes. The essays in this volume, if read in sequence, gradually unfold to the reader the implications of this non-Cartesian outlook. As this collection goes along, the inferentialist position sketched in the first two essays is restated in various contexts so that, by the time the concluding papers on Kant are reached, the reader has been given a tour d'horizon not only of the central topics of philosophy of mind and language, but much of the history of philosophy as well. If analytic philosophers were to come to accept inferentialism, they would have to rethink almost every topic that they have discussed, from intentionality to meaning-change to indeterminacy of reference to mind-body identity to Kant's transcendental ego. There would be a sea change in philosophy far more profound than that caused by Quine's "Two Dogmas." This book, for the first time, gives them the opportunity to study the case for bringing about this change, as that case was presented by the philosopher who first realized inferentialism's full implications. I very much hope that it will be published quickly, since I believe that its appearance will have an important influence on the course of philosophical thought.

Sellars was as original a mind as C.S. Peirce, and it has taken almost as long for the importance of his ideas to be appreciated. Once this collection appears in print, we shall see articles about Sellars popping up all over the journals, just as articles about Peirce began popping up after Hartshorne and Weiss had finished their editorial work. The editors of the collection have made very judicious choices about what to republish. They have arranged the essays in an illuminating sequence so as to make clear that the heart of Sellars's thought is what Brandom calls his "inferentialist" conception of meaning. Inferentialism was shadowed forth darkly in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, but Sellars was the first to make it explicit and to grasp its full implications. It represents a radical break with the representationalist way of thinking of mental and linguistic items that has been dominant in Western philosophy since Descartes. The essays in this volume, if read in sequence, gradually unfold to the reader the implications of this non-Cartesian outlook. As this collection goes along, the inferentialist position sketched in the first two essays is restated in various contexts so that, by the time the concluding papers on Kant are reached, the reader has been given a tour d'horizon not only of the central topics of philosophy of mind and language, but much of the history of philosophy as well. If analytic philosophers were to come to accept inferentialism, they would have to rethink almost every topic that they have discussed, from intentionality to meaning-change to indeterminacy of reference to mind-body identity to Kant's transcendental ego. There would be a sea change in philosophy far more profound than that caused by Quine's "Two Dogmas." This book, for the first time, gives them the opportunity to study the case for bringing about this change, as that case was presented by the philosopher who first realized inferentialism's full implications. I very much hope that it will be published quickly, since I believe that its appearance will have an important influence on the course of philosophical thought. -- Richard Rorty