The essays in this collection explore the idea that discursive norms—the norms governing our thought and talk—are profoundly social. Not only do these norms govern and structure of social interactions, but they are sustained by a variety of social and institutional structures.

Chapter 1. Introduction: Themes in the Study of Human Cognition as a Social PhenomenonPreston Stovall and Leo TownsendPart I. Historical PerspectivesChapter 2. The Fine Structure of Autonomy and RecognitionRobert BrandomChapter 3. I, Thou, and We: Peirce and Brandom on the Objectivity of NormsVitaly Kiryushchenko Chapter 4. Social Roles as Practical Reasons? Questioning Brandomian PragmatismHans Bernhard SchmidPart II. Naturalist PerspectivesChapter 5. Assertion: A Pragmatic GenealogyLadislav KoreňChapter 6. Normative AttitudesJaroslav PeregrinChapter 7. Normative Attitudes, Shared Intentionality, and Discursive CognitionPreston StovallChapter 8. Two Pillars of Institutions: Constitutive Rules and ParticipationWolfgang HuemerPart III. Social-Pragmatic PerspectivesChapter 9. An I without a You? An Exercise in Normative PragmaticsJeremy WandererChapter 10. "I Really Didn’t Say Everything I Said": The Pragmatics of RetractionQuill Kukla and Dan SteinbergChapter 11. Discursive Injustice and the Speech of Indigenous CommunitiesLeo TownsendChapter 12. Slurring Speech and Social NormsMihaela Popa-Wyatt