Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question 'Why should I be moral?' and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, this title is suitable for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.

Preface ix Introduction 1 1. "Squeezing the Good into the Right through the Tubes of Imperfection" 7 2. The Relevance of Action Theory 14 PART ONE: Explaining Action 21 1. A Puzzle about Intention 23 2. The Belief-Desire Model 28 3. Acting for Reasons 39 4. Solving the Puzzle 48 5. A Causal Theory of Action? 56 6. Against the Guise of the Good 59 PART TWO: Why Virtue Matters to the Study of Practical Reason 68 1. Character and Practical Thought 70 2. An Argument for the Virtue Theory 79 3. Practical Reason and the Guise of the Good 86 4. Motivation and Desire 99 5. Self-Knowledge as the Aim of Action 107 Conclusion 116 Bibliography 121 Index 129

"Kieran Setiya urges the radical thesis that the 'should' of practical rationality just is the 'should' of ethical character. His argument turns on taking issue with the orthodox view that practical rationality is exercised under the aspect of the good, and on rejecting all forms of the idea that the nature of practical rationality can be understood from reflection about reason and action as such. Setiya handles his intricate argument deftly, and his book is a pleasure, as well as a challenge, to read. Anyone interested in its topics will need to give it serious attention."—John McDowell, University of Pittsburgh"It is a great virtue of Kieran Setiya's Reasons without Rationalism that it poses the issue between rationalism and virtue theory in such clear terms. If one accepts the kind of minimalist conception of practical thought that Setiya favors, then there is probably nothing else for good practical thought to be except a disposition to intentional action that is good as a trait of character. Setiya's subtle and provocative development of this line of thought is a substantial philosophical achievement. It offers a distinctive and interesting account of intentional action, and shows how that account provides the basis for a distinctive way of thinking about practical reason, in terms of virtues of character."—Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley"This is a valuable work that contains sharp and interesting arguments. It is original and makes a refreshing contribution to a discussion that, while it fascinates many moral psychologists, threatens to become stale and repetitive. It should also be of interest to ethicists and metaethicists, even though it is not about morality in the narrow sense."—Nomy Arpaly, Brown University

Kieran Setiya urges the radical thesis that the 'should' of practical rationality just is the 'should' of ethical character. His argument turns on taking issue with the orthodox view that practical rationality is exercised under the aspect of the good, and on rejecting all forms of the idea that the nature of practical rationality can be understood from reflection about reason and action as such. Setiya handles his intricate argument deftly, and his book is a pleasure, as well as a challenge, to read. Anyone interested in its topics will need to give it serious attention. -- John McDowell, University of Pittsburgh It is a great virtue of Kieran Setiya's Reasons without Rationalism that it poses the issue between rationalism and virtue theory in such clear terms. If one accepts the kind of minimalist conception of practical thought that Setiya favors, then there is probably nothing else for good practical thought to be except a disposition to intentional action that is good as a trait of character. Setiya's subtle and provocative development of this line of thought is a substantial philosophical achievement. It offers a distinctive and interesting account of intentional action, and shows how that account provides the basis for a distinctive way of thinking about practical reason, in terms of virtues of character. -- Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley This is a valuable work that contains sharp and interesting arguments. It is original and makes a refreshing contribution to a discussion that, while it fascinates many moral psychologists, threatens to become stale and repetitive. It should also be of interest to ethicists and metaethicists, even though it is not about morality in the narrow sense. -- Nomy Arpaly, Brown University