The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general. Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
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This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.
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Daniel Star: Introduction Part I: The Structure of Reasons and Normativity 1: Ralph Wedgwood: The Unity of Normativity 2: Mark Schroeder: The Unity of Reasons 3: Shyam Nair and John Horty: The Logic of Reasons 4: Aaron Bronfman and J. L. Dowell: The Language of Ought, and Reasons 5: John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor: Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons Part II: Reasons, Motivation, and Action Explanation 6: Hille Paakkunainen: Internalism and Externalism about Reasons 7: David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons 8: Eric Wiland: Psychologism and Anti-psychologism about Motivating Reasons 9: Benjamin Wald and Sergio Tenenbaum: Reasons and Action Explanation 10: Bart Streumer: 1. Reasons and Ability Part III: Reasons Fundamentalism 11: Jonas Olson: The Metaphysics of Reasons 12: Philip Stratton-Lake: Reasons Fundamentalism and Value 13: John Broome: Reasons Fundamentalism and What is Wrong with It Part IV: Reasons Explained 14: John Brunero: Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations 15: Nicholas Southwood: Constructivism about Reasons 16: Paul Katsafanas: Constitutivism about Practical Reasons Part V: Practical Deliberation 17: Antti Kauppinen: Practical Reasoning 18: Garrett Cullity: Weighing Reasons 19: Joshua Gert: Underdetermination by Reasons 20: Stephen Kearns: Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility Part VI: Reasoning and Rationality 21: Jonathan Way: Reasons and Rationality 22: Corine Besson: Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll's Regress Argument 23: Clayton Littlejohn: Reasons and Theoretical Rationality Part VII: Epistemic Reasons 24: Kurt Sylvan and Ernest Sosa: The Place of Reasons in Epistemology 25: Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss: Reasons for Belief and Normativity 26: Errol Lord: Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters Part VIII: Types and Sources of Reasons for Belief 27: Declan Smithies: Reasons and Perception 28: Sanford Goldberg: Reasons and Testimony 29: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief 30: Andrew Reisner: Pragmatic Reasons for Belief Part IX: Types and Sources of Reasons for Action 31: Niko Kolodny: Instrumental Reasons 32: Douglas W. Portmore: Teleological Reasons 33: Andrew Sepielli: Subjective and Objective Reasons 34: Roger Crisp: Prudential and Moral Reasons 35: Krister Bykvist: Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Reasons 36: Pekka Väyrynen: Reasons and Moral Principles Part X: Reasons Difficult to Categorize 37: Ulrike Heuer: Reasons to Intend 38: Christine Tappolet: Reasons and Emotions 39: Andrew McGonigal: Aesthetic Reasons Part XI: Skepticism about Reasons 40: Caitrin Donovan, Cordelia Fine, and Jeanette Kennett: Reliable and Unreliable Judgments about Reasons 41: Terence Cuneo: The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons Part XII: Normativity, Meaning, and the Mind 42: Hannah Ginsborg: Normativity and Concepts 43: David Liebesman: The Normativity of Meaning 44: Anandi Hattiangadi: Normativity and Intentionality
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A central set of topics in philosophy, mapped out for the first time Bridges moral philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of action, mind, and language An authoritative guide to reseach in the area, surveying what's been done and opening up new avenues of inquiry Unbeatable line-up of contributors
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Daniel Star is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, and author of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics (OUP, 2015).
A central set of topics in philosophy, mapped out for the first time Bridges moral philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of action, mind, and language An authoritative guide to reseach in the area, surveying what's been done and opening up new avenues of inquiry Unbeatable line-up of contributors
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199657889
Publisert
2018
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press
Vekt
1839 gr
Høyde
246 mm
Bredde
171 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
1102

Redaktør

Om bidragsyterne

Daniel Star is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, and author of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics (OUP, 2015).