This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, “morally monstrous-like” crimes and weak-willed actions of some.
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This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, “morally monstrous-like” crimes and weak-willed actions of some.
Les mer
Editorial Foreword by Gerhold K. Becker Foreword by Paul Russell Preface ONE Responsibility, Determinism, and Freedom TWO Practical Compatibilism and Ultimacy Pessimism THREE Freedom and Blameworthy Actions FOUR Blameworthy Actions and Normative Disagreements FIVE Ultimacy Pessimism and the Question of Authority Works Cited Glossary About the Author Index
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Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9789042017443
Publisert
2005-01-01
Utgiver
Vendor
Editions Rodopi B.V.
Vekt
292 gr
Høyde
220 mm
Bredde
150 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet

Forfatter

Om bidragsyterne

Maureen Sie was born in 1966, in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. She is employed as Assistant Professor of Meta-ethics at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Her research concerns questions of Meta-ethics and theories of moral responsibility. Her most recent publication is the co-edited volume Reasons of One’s Own (Ashgate, 2004). Her previous publications on the subject of responsibility are: “Responsibility in Autonomy Undermining Circumstances,” Ethical Perspectives, 5, (1998), pp. 30–35; “Goodwill, Determinism and Justification,” Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers (eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, (1998), pp. 113–129; “Freedom and Blameworthiness,” Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Ton van den Beld (ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), pp. 113–128; “Mad, Bad, or Disagreeing? On Moral Competence and Responsibility,” Philosophical Explorations, 3 (September). Assen: Van Gorcum, (2001), pp. 262–281.