Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If not, when do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? What are the moral and legal implications? In this book, philosophers address these questions.

Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning: An Introduction by Ruth Chang Incommensurability: What's the Problem by James Griffin Incommensurability: Four Proposals by David Wiggins Is Incommensurability Vagueness? by John Broome Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods by Elizabeth Anderson Incommensurability and Agency by Joseph Raz Comparability, Value, and Choice by Donald Regan Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning by Elijah Millgram Comparing the Incomparable: Tradeoffs and Sacrifices by Steven Lukes Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and Maximization by Michael Stocker Leading a Life by Charles Taylor Commensuration and Public Reason by John Finnis Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law by Cass Sunstein