Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.

Acknowledgments Introduction 1: Defending a Source View 2: Problems for Event-Causal and Non-Causal Libertarianisms 3: The Prospects for Agent Causal Libertarianism 4: A Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism 5: Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation 6: Blame without Basic Desert 7: Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior 8: Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life Bibliography

With Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014), Pereboom has written yet another outstanding book. This one is certainly as good as the last, and it promises to have the same sort of influence. In numerous ways, he has yet again moved the debate much further along, and he has done so in the interest of genuine philosophical progress. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life is an extraordinary defense of free will and moral responsibility skepticism.

`This new book will be a vital resource for students of free will and moral responsibility: it is a state-of-the-art defence of one of the central positions in the debate, elaborated by its foremost exponent. Of particular interest will be the ways in which Pereboom's thinking has evolved over the years and the thoughtful attention he gives to criticisms of his earlier work.' Matthew Talbert, Mind `Pereboom's book is a wonderful addition to the moral responsibility debate, which not only organizes the contemporary responses to the worries of the Hard Incompatibilism, but also quite helpfully engages with those responses to press the discussion and our understanding forward. For those new comers interested in the state of the contemporary debate which are either interested in Hard Determinism or worried about the prospects of alternative views given Determinism this book is a helpful guide for finding your footing. And for those already familiar with the literature, it will be a welcome addition to your library.' Shane J. George, Journal of Value Inquiry `this book s a masterful and comprehensive articulation of Derk Pereboom's very important and original theory of free will and moral responsibility. Throughout his career, and especially here in this book, Pereboom has developed and defended one of the real contenders as a comprehensive theory of freedom and responsibility. This is a huge, and admirable, intellectual achievement.' John Martin Fischer, Science, Religion, and Culture `a must-read for anyone in the world interested in these foundational issues . . . will be a centerpiece of the conversation about the metaphysics of free will, about morality, about moral responsibility and our related emotions and practices, about the pressing practical and moral issues concerning punishment, and about meaning in life . . . a wonderful manifestation of a commitment to certain intellectual values, including seeing philosophy as an inclusive conversation, and to testing and revising one's views in the search for truth.' Dana Nelkin, Science, Religion, and Culture `It is hard to imagine a more rigorously defended articulation of free will skepticism . . . This book is state of the art, and it should be taught widely.' David Shoemaker, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews `Derk Perebooms Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life is an impressive, wideranging book.' Alfred R. Mele, Criminal Law and Philosophy

Derk Pereboom is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University. He is the author of Living Without Free Will (Cambridge 2001), Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (Oxford 2011), and of articles on free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, and the history of modern philosophy, especially Immanuel Kant.