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Paul Schofield is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bates College in Lewiston, Maine. He writes about ethics, politics, and film.Schofield's framework is inventive and fruitful.
Daniel Muñoz, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Ethics
In this well-written, historically informed, and thought-provoking book, Paul Schofield argues that the answer may well be "yes." If you begin this book thinking that the very idea of an intrapersonal moral duty just doesn't make sense, you should finish it thinking you were wrong...Schofield has given us a rich account of how we can have duties to ourselves. If you're at all interested in that topic and, more broadly, the nature of the moral domain, you should read this book.
Daniel Groll, Criminal Law and Philosophy
In Duty to Self: Moral, Political, and Legal Self-Relation, Paul Schofield has written a deep, erudite, and comprehensive defense of the view that we do owe duties to ourselves. Schofield presents a range of arguments for this claim, one which many contemporary ethicists have found counter-intuitive, as self-regard has often been viewed as a matter of prudence rather than morality. I learned an enormous amount from reading this book, and I highly recommend it.
Julia Driver, Professor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin
The idea of duties to oneself occupies a peculiar place in philosophy and in everyday thinking. We say things like 'You owe it to yourself,' and indeed it might seem that if there are duties and obligations at all then they apply to all the people in question, including oneself. And yet other familiar relations of authority require a separation between the power to impose an obligation and the subjection to that obligation, if there is to be any binding at all. Thus, some moral and political philosophers have found the very notion of duties to oneself to be incoherent, while others have argued that duties to oneself are fundamental to the idea of duties of any kind. Paul Schofield's exciting and ground-breaking book not only presents a sustained case for the coherence of the idea of duties to oneself but shows how revisionary taking this idea seriously can turn out to be.
Richard Moran, Brian D. Young Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University
Modern moral philosophy's preoccupation with interpersonal duties has led to a neglect of, and scepticism concerning, duties to ourselves. In Duty to Self, Paul Schofield not only rebuts the sources of such scepticism, he convincingly illustrates how we can occupy a second-personal moral standpoint on our choices and our lives. Schofield's conclusions have fascinating and wide-ranging implications in the practical, political, and legal realms.
Michael Cholbi, Professor of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh