John Martin Fischer's new collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known compatibilist approach to moral responsibilityEL. Predominantly a collection of detailed responses to recent critics, this is not a book for beginners. It is, however, essential reading for specialists, as well as useful reading for non-specialists seeking a snapshot of the current state of the debate. Fischer's papers are dense with argument and alive with original and productive ideas.

Michael Garnett, Analysis

As always, Fischer is highly sensitive to the subtleties and intricacies of the arguments but has an uncanny ability to cut to the heart of the issues. And as always, he is charitable to his opponents. Fischer's insights here, as in his other work, will prove invaluable for framing the debate and moving it forward

Meghan Griffith, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

In this collection of essays -- a follow up to My Way and Our Stories -- John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control". Fischer defines deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control". Our freedom consists of the power to add to the given past, holding fixed the laws of nature, and therefore, Fischer contends, we must be able to interpret our actions as extensions of a line that represents the actual past. In "connecting the dots", we engage in a distinctive sort of self-expression. In the first group of essays in this volume, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alterative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. Thus, the line need not branch off at crucial points (where the branches represent genuine metaphysical possibilities). In the remaining essays in the collection he demonstrates that deep control is the freedom condition on moral responsibility. In so arguing, Fischer contends that total control is too much to ask--it is a form of "metaphysical megalomania". So we do not need to "trace back" all the way to the beginning of the line (or even farther) in seeking the relevant kind of freedom or control. Additionally, he contends that various kinds of "superficial control"--such as versions of "conditional freedom" and "judgment-sensitivity" are too shallow; they don't trace back far enough along the line. In short, Fischer argues that, in seeking the freedom that grounds moral responsibility, we need to carve out a middle ground between superficiality and excessive penetration. Deep Control is the "middle way". Fischer presents a new argument that deep control is compatible not just with causal determinism, but also causal indeterminism. He thus tackles the luck problem and shows that the solution to this problem is parallel in important ways to the considerations in favor of the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility.
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In this collection of essays -- a follow up to My Way and Our Stories -- John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control." Fischer defines deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control."
Les mer
Contents ; I. Introduction; Deep Control: The Middle Way ; Part One: An Actual-Sequence Approach to Moral Responsibility ; 2. The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories ; 3. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin ; 4. The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument ; 5. Blame and Avoidability: a Reply to Otsuka (with Neal A. Tognazzini) ; 6. Indeterminism and Control: An Approach to the Problem of Luck ; Part Two: The Middle Path: Guidance Control ; 7. The Direct Argument: You Say Goodbye, I Say Hello ; 8. Conditional Freedom and the Normative Approach to Moral Responsibility ; 9. Judgment-Sensitivity and the Value of Freedom ; 10. Sourcehood: Playing the Cards that Are Dealt You ; 11. Guidance Control ; 12. The Triumph of Tracing (with Neal A. Tognazzini
Les mer
John Martin Fischer's new collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known compatibilist approach to moral responsibilityEL. Predominantly a collection of detailed responses to recent critics, this is not a book for beginners. It is, however, essential reading for specialists, as well as useful reading for non-specialists seeking a snapshot of the current state of the debate. Fischer's papers are dense with argument and alive with original and productive ideas.
Les mer
"John Martin Fischer's new collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known compatibilist approach to moral responsibilityEL. Predominantly a collection of detailed responses to recent critics, this is not a book for beginners. It is, however, essential reading for specialists, as well as useful reading for non-specialists seeking a snapshot of the current state of the debate. Fischer's papers are dense with argument and alive with original and productive ideas."- Michael Garnett, Analysis "As always, Fischer is highly sensitive to the subtleties and intricacies of the arguments but has an uncanny ability to cut to the heart of the issues. And as always, he is charitable to his opponents. Fischer's insights here, as in his other work, will prove invaluable for framing the debate and moving it forward." - Meghan Griffith, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Les mer
Selling point: The essays--including a new, previously unpublished introduction--provide a systematic defense of the notion that moral responsibility does not require freedom to choose and do otherwise. Selling point: Fischer offers an original answer to the "luck problem" (for libertarian accounts of moral responsibility) that is continuous with his defense of the contention (that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities). Selling point: Offers a taxonomy and evaluation of various "normative" accounts of moral responsibility Selling point: Contends that the distinction between "metaphysical" and "normative" accounts of moral responsibility is under-theorized, and provides the beginnings of the required theory.
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John Martin Fischer received his BA and MA in philosophy from Stanford University, and his PhD in philosophy from Cornell. He has taught at Yale, UCLA, and Santa Clara University. He is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, where he holds a UC President's Chair.
Les mer
Selling point: The essays--including a new, previously unpublished introduction--provide a systematic defense of the notion that moral responsibility does not require freedom to choose and do otherwise. Selling point: Fischer offers an original answer to the "luck problem" (for libertarian accounts of moral responsibility) that is continuous with his defense of the contention (that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities). Selling point: Offers a taxonomy and evaluation of various "normative" accounts of moral responsibility Selling point: Contends that the distinction between "metaphysical" and "normative" accounts of moral responsibility is under-theorized, and provides the beginnings of the required theory.
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199742981
Publisert
2012
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press Inc
Vekt
476 gr
Høyde
163 mm
Bredde
236 mm
Dybde
23 mm
Aldersnivå
UP, 05
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
256

Om bidragsyterne

John Martin Fischer received his BA and MA in philosophy from Stanford University, and his PhD in philosophy from Cornell. He has taught at Yale, UCLA, and Santa Clara University. He is a Distinguished Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosphy, University of California, Riverside, where he holds a UC President's Chair.