This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.
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1. Introduction; 2. Electoral and fiscal institutions and forms of fiscal governance; 3. An account of fiscal norms and rules in the European Union from 1985 to 2004; 4. How forms of fiscal governance affect fiscal performance; 5. Why do countries have different fiscal institutions?; 6. Institutional choice in new democracies: fiscal governance in Central and East European countries; 7. EMU and fiscal governance in Europe; 8. Conclusion.
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Reviews of the hardback: 'Over the past several years, Mark Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch and Jürgen von Hagen have made path breaking contributions on the way fiscal institutions shape budgetary behaviour and on the interplay between fiscal policy and politics in Europe. … [This book] brings together and updates their theoretical and empirical research and provides new insights on fiscal governance in the European Union. As the financial crisis shakes the foundations of policy making in Europe and beyond, this book will help understand why countries' budgetary policies will react in different ways and how fiscal institutions may evolve as a response to new economic and policy challenges.' Marco Buti, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
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Based on data from European Union countries, this book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions.
Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780521857468
Publisert
2009-03-16
Utgiver
Vendor
Cambridge University Press
Vekt
480 gr
Høyde
235 mm
Bredde
160 mm
Dybde
21 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
246